What usable security really means: Trusting and engaging users by Kirlappos, I & Sasse, MA
What Usable Security Really Means:  
Trusting and Engaging Users 
Iacovos Kirlappos and M. Angela Sasse 
University College London, Department of Computer Science,  
London, United Kingdom 
{i.kirlappos,a.sasse}@cs.ucl.ac.uk 
Abstract.  Non-compliance with security mechanisms and processes poses a significant risk to organiza-
tional security.  Current approaches focus on designing systems that restrict user actions to make them 
‘secure’, or providing user interfaces to make security tools ‘easy to use’.  We argue that an important but 
often-neglected aspect of compliance is trusting employees to ‘do what’s right’ for security.  Previous stud-
ies suggest that most employees are intrinsically motivated to behave securely, and that contextual elements 
of their relationship with the organization provide further motivation to stay secure.  Drawing on research 
on trust, usable security, and economics of information security, we outline how the organization-employee 
trust relationship can be leveraged by security designers. 
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1 Current State of Security Implementations in Organizations 
For most people, the term ‘information security’ evokes technical mechanisms - such as authentication and access control 
- implemented to protect organizational assets [1].  Over the past two decades, awareness has been growing that many 
information security breaches were results of human error and social engineering; Bruce Schneier described people as the 
“weakest link” in the security chain [2].  Whilst some security experts have, unhelpfully, described users as stupid or 
careless [3], others have tried to increase compliance by providing ‘more usable’ security in some form.  An implicit 
assumption of this work has been that - if people are able to use a security mechanism correctly, they would be motivated 
to do so [4-9].  But work by usability researchers who listen closely to users [10],[11] and economics-inspired researchers 
looking at cost and benefits of security mechanisms [12],[13] suggests that the assumption that ‘users want security, 
provided it’s not too difficult to use’ may be wide off the mark [11],[12],[14].  Users look for efficiencies in their daily 
lives, and that means ‘the less I have to think about security, the better’.  And given that is the case, trust becomes 
important.  The traditional “command-and-control” approach to information security management treats employees as 
untrustworthy components, whose behavior has to be constrained [4]. But recent research has revealed that even employ-
ees who do not comply with some security policies are motivated and act responsible when they recognize a security risk, 
and the cost to them is reasonable [10],[11],[15].   
Thus, designers of security mechanisms should consider how trust between an organization and its employees affects 
security behaviors.  The role of trust in technology design has been examined by research aiming to create technology 
platforms that enable the development of trust relationships in online commerce and gaming [16-21].  In this paper we 
take a different path, building on the trust model by Riegelsberger et al. [16] to explain the benefits of treating employees 
as trusted entities in organizational security implementations.  We (1) use the model explain the creation of a trust rela-
tionship between employees and organization, (2) analyze how that affects employee compliance decisions with security 
policies and mechanisms, and (3) present how the organization-employee trust relationship can be leveraged by security 
designers to create usable and effective security implementations.  
2 Trust in the Organization-Employee Security Relationships 
Trust is defined as the “willingness to be vulnerable based on positive expectations about the actions of others” [22] and 
is only required in interactions where risk and uncertainty about the outcome exist.  Risk usually arises from the potential 
losses a trustor (trusting actor) suffers if the trustee (trusted actor) does not behave as expected, whilst uncertainty arises 
from the lack of information about the ability and motivation of the trustee [16].  Both risk and uncertainty leave trustors 
vulnerable.  The trustee’s decision to behave in a trustworthy manner depends on a number of factors called trust-war-
ranting properties, which can be distinguished between intrinsic and contextual [16]. 
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 Intrinsic properties (ability and motivation):  These provide incentives for trustworthy behaviors internal to an indi-
vidual.  In the interaction of an employee with a security mechanism ability stems from the mechanism’s usability and 
an individual’s knowledge, while motivation comes from internalized norms and benevolence that dictate doing what 
they perceive to be “the right thing” in order to protect the organization they work for.  
 Contextual properties (temporal, social and institutional embeddedness): These depend on the context of the interac-
tion and trustworthy behavior incentives for employees emerge from external factors:  
─ Temporal embeddedness – When the prospect of repeated future interactions exist (e.g. long term future in the 
organization), employees are motivated to preserve the trust relationship. 
─ Social embeddedness – When a compliant social environment exists, new employees try to fit in and mimic the 
behavior of others.  If the majority behaves in a trustworthy manner, violations can become socially unacceptable, 
providing incentive to individuals to exhibit trustworthy behavior. 
─ Institutional embeddedness – The strictness, severity and potential of punishment imposed upon an employee, to-
gether with high probability of misbehavior detection, acts as a deterrent factor to trust defection. 
 
Fig. 1. The organization-employee trust relationship model  
(adapted from Riegelsberger et al. [16])  
3 Treating Users as Untrustworthy Components 
Traditionally, information security focused on creating contextually-incentivized trustworthy behavior: imposed re-
strictions, controls and policies aim to create incentives for security compliance.  This approach assumes users do not 
possess intrinsic motives to behave securely. But most employees in most organizations are trustworthy, and suggesting 
and they are not is counterproductive [11],[15],[23]: (i) it increases security enforcement costs, (ii) makes employees 
feeling untrusted, (iii) encourages creation of non-compliant environments, and (iv) negatively impacts security experts’ 
ability to detect violations. 
3.1 Enforcement is Expensive  
Attempts to enforce desired behaviors upon employees increase the need for architectural means (security mechanisms) 
and formal procedures (policies) [24], which restrict and monitor employee actions.  This increases the workload for both 
security experts and employees:  
1. The increasing complexity of the threat landscape means defining, communicating and enforcing policy-compliant 
behavior to employees for all existing security challenges becomes monumental.  Any attempts to achieve this become 
uneconomic for security experts, constrained by finite investment resources (workforce, time and budget) and may 
lead to security experts compromising with sub-optimal solutions [24],[25].    
2. It is equally impossible for employees to memorize all approved behaviors and exhibit those in the organizational 
environment.  Security designers, who distrust users, ask them to expend significant effort on security mechanisms.  
Not adopting a genuine user-centered perspective, they do not accept that security from the user’s perspective is a 
secondary task, and that time and effort consumed eats into the users’ primary task performance – and ultimately, that 
of the organization [12].  More often than not, users circumvent security because it gets in the way of their main job 
[23],[26]: users are focused on their primary work tasks and have a limited compliance budget for security [10] - so 
they try to avoid security that poses a significant obstacle to the completion of their day-to-day activities [12].  This 
leads to the development of insecure informal rules [24] and non-compliance becomes organizational security culture.  
3.2 Enforcement Leads to Distrust 
Treating employees as a potential threat leads to security implementations that protect from the actions of employees, 
who never showed any intention to damage the organization. Their non-compliance, however, stems from the difficulty 
to comply with security solutions that have high workload and interfere with their primary tasks [10].  For example, 
employees may share authentication credentials because of clear business needs:  a colleague needs access to complete 
an urgent task, but there is no way to get credentials quickly [27].  When employees report that mechanisms are difficult 
or impossible to comply with, security experts tend to dismiss those reports with ‘you just do to not understand the risks’ 
[11].  This leads to employees feeling distrusted by the security experts.  Employees who are frustrated with high security 
overhead and do not feel trusted are likely to develop a negative attitude towards security.  This leads to the creation of a 
value gap between security and production parts of an organization, and reduces employee’s willingness to collaborate 
to keep the organization secure [28].  When that negative attitude becomes prominent, it leads to widespread non-com-
pliance [32], insider attacks [14] and valuable employees that feel untrusted leaving organization (loss of human capital) 
[29].   
3.3 Non-compliance Becomes The Norm 
In many organizations, non-compliance has become prevalent behavior.  Managers who trust their employees tolerate 
bending and circumvention of burdensome security policies and mechanisms. This does not mean that security is ignored: 
rather, employees create their own ways of keeping things they value secure, creating a shadow security environment 
[11].  This may have no resemblance to the organization’s official rules, and cannot manage risks effectively, because 
employees do not have an accurate understanding of the risks and countermeasures.  When security violations become a 
norm, the effects of social embeddedness on exhibiting trustworthy behavior are eliminated: new employees that try to 
“fit in” are more likely to follow suit to their colleague’s non-compliance [30]. 
3.4 Ability to Detect Violations is Reduced 
When rule-bending or breaking becomes an organizational norm, detection of malicious activity becomes difficult.  Or-
ganization-wide rule breaking introduces significant amounts of noise in any attempts to detect suspicious activity as 
observed non-compliant behaviors can be both legitimate and malicious.  This reduces the ability of security experts to 
detect and take remediating actions before the problems escalate [14].  It also makes security more expensive, requiring 
further investment to distinguish between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ non-compliant behaviors, further increasing the cost of archi-
tectural means to keep the organization secure [24]. 
3.5 Need for Trust in Security Design 
The aforementioned problems suggest the need for security design to re-consider the intrinsic propensity of employees to 
be trustworthy: the current “command-and-control” approach does more harm than the attacks it seeks to prevent [7].  
Employees possess the intrinsic properties required to behave securely: they are motivated and willing to participate in 
security, as long as their ability to complete their primary tasks is not significantly hindered by burdensome security 
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implementations [11],[14],[15],[23].  They are also capable of taking actions to protect the organization, without excessive 
restrictions on their systems and information access.  In addition they can participate in security re-thinking as long as the 
experts listen to their feedback and use it to implement visible changes to the organizational security policies and mech-
anisms [11].  The high trust that can emerge from such an environment has social and economic benefits for the organi-
zation: it reduces the costs of compliance enforcement [24] and disgruntlement [17] (which is the starting point for most 
insider attacks [14] and improves organizational adaptability to the changing nature of modern security challenges [32]).  
4 Incorporating Trust in Security Design 
Genuine engagement of employees in security protection can have a positive effect for the organization.  Collaboration 
builds social capital1, creating mutual beliefs and norms which can be leveraged to improve organizational security per-
formance [33],[34]: organizations where employees have increased responsibilities are more likely to establish a high-
level of security awareness and improved understanding about the need for security.  This can inject security-conscious 
behavior in the psychological contracts2 that dictate employee-employer relationships, increasing the overall workforce 
engagement in security, and improving the effectiveness of security implementations.  The emerging security conscious-
ness also has positive economic effects on the security implementation: compliance comes from employees motivated to 
behave securely, based on norms developed by the existence of ‘informal rules’ that are significantly cheaper to enforce 
than formal rules and architectural means [24].  The emergent trusted environment also reduces potential disgruntlement 
from employees and all the potential negative effects of it (loss of human capital, insider attacks).  The new dynamics 
that emerge can aid the organization grow especially in the new era of distributed workforce with looser and more rapidly 
changing organizational environments [32].  In the remainder of this section we discuss how trust can be incorporated in 
designing or improving security implementations, touching on four elements that currently appear to require improve-
ments: usability (improving employee ability to behave in a trustworthy way), awareness (improving motivation to do 
so), participation (improving organizational ability to identify problems) and punishment (providing contextual incentives 
for compliance).  Effective security design should aim to combine all four to balance assurance (based on architectural 
means and formal rules) and trust (informal rules) to create cheaper and more effective security implementations [30].   
4.1 Improving Usability By Learning from Circumventions 
A key requirement for employees to behave securely is the usability of security mechanisms they have to use.  Security 
mechanisms that are difficult or impossible to use drive even trustworthy users to non-compliance [15].  Security design-
ers and organizations need to think about usable security as a key factor of organizational security hygiene: rules should 
not have to be broken for productivity reasons.  Flexibility may be available for urgent situations (e.g. give a password to 
a colleague who was locked out of a system), but employees should have to report these violations using an approved 
controlled circumvention system [27].  Some organizations already have self-reporting mechanisms that offer amnesty 
from sanctions to employees who self-report, but these are not helpful if self-reporting just becomes an additional task 
employees have to do. The causes for non-compliance have to be investigated and removed.  Rules that need to be cir-
cumvented often should then be considered as unfit to support the organization.   Re-designing such rules and mechanisms 
should be seen as essential security hygiene, part of an ongoing process of adapting security to fit with users’ primary 
task and business processes [11]. 
                                                     
1  Expected collective benefits derived from cooperation between individuals or groups [31]  
2  Mutual beliefs, perceptions, and informal obligations between employers and employees [35] 
4.2 Improving Awareness and Education 
When security hygiene is in place, security design should build on trustworthy behavior enabled by genuinely usable 
security.  Once that is in place, appropriate awareness campaigns to increase employee motivation to behave securely can 
be considered.  Security designers need to identify and target current employee perceptions with context specific examples 
drawn from the work environment, which may differ across various employee groups [15].  The emerging communication 
should aim to change the perception of information security as something that protects the business process, thus present-
ing it as an integral part of it.  This can be done by: (i) stressing the importance of security in protecting the organization 
and the resources that enable primary task completion and (ii) explaining the critical role employees can play in it [36].  
Any education and training material used should always be easily available for employees that need to refer back to it.   
4.3 Engaging With Line Managers  
Line managers need to be encouraged to shape an organization’s security.  Security experts need to draw on their 
knowledge of business processes to (1) learn from circumventions and (2) get help with tailoring security awareness and 
make it relevant to their staff.  Managers have a considerable influence on their staff’s security decisions [11], and with 
help from security experts, they can assess the role-related risks within their teams and communicate desired behaviors.  
Increased awareness and ability to connect with the risks presented by their managers can provide additional motivation 
for employees to behave securely and can trigger internalized norms and benevolence-related compliance by employees 
that feel they are acting to the organization’s interest.  This can lead to the creation of security conscious informal rules 
and a security implementation based on a bottom up collaborative approach where employees feel trusted and motivated 
to collaborate in the emergent participatory security environment [11].   
4.4 Balancing Trust and Assurance 
Improvements of the trust relationship do not mean that an organization should completely abandon its deployed security 
mechanisms: contextual properties are also important to employees exhibiting trustworthy behavior [30].  When the 
ground that allows for intrinsic trustworthy behavior is created (employees are able and motivated to do so), employees 
should be discouraged breaking trust relationships by appropriate assurance mechanisms.  Employees that are caught to 
abuse trust should then be visibly punished; high risk of being caught together with severe consequences has a dissuading 
effect for potential trust violators.  In other words, organizations need to balance trust-based trustworthy behavior (based 
on ability and motivation) and assurance-based trustworthy behavior (based on contextual properties).  
Organizations also need to recognize that, in addition to context dependent, trust is also conditional [37]: employees that 
have been in the organization for longer may feel more loyal, thus motivated to behave securely.  Instead of all employees 
having to deal with the same procedures from day 1, increased levels of assurance can be implemented for new employees, 
with the restrictions gradually reduced the longer an employee stays in the organization – assurance should evolve to trust 
over time.  Reducing the need for productivity-driven violations also improves the security experts’ ability to protect the 
organization: reduction of the ‘noise’ introduced by productivity-driven ‘legitimate’ violations enables the implementa-
tion of clever monitoring implementations to identify malicious activity (insider or outsider attacks) [38].   
5 Conclusion  
Treating employees as a trusted entity when designing (new or improved) security processes and mechanisms can signif-
icantly benefit the organization and its security experts.  It reduces the organization’s exposure to information security 
risks by improving its security hygiene.  Improved efficiency of deployed security approaches also reduces the overhead 
impact of security on the production tasks and employee frustration with security, creating a more positive, participatory 
approach to keeping the organization secure.  This increases an organization’s ability to depend on the human defenses 
(in this case employees) to manage its information security risks.  Trust also improves employee attitudes, work behaviors 
and job satisfaction and makes security management economically more efficient, as implementation and maintenance of 
many cumbersome mechanisms becomes obsolete.   
Improved trust relationships can emerge through: (i) improved usability of security mechanisms to improve on employee 
ability to comply, (ii) improved awareness to provide motivation, (iii) participatory security and middle management 
involvement to improve on the security designers’ ability to identify and deploy improvements and (iv) monitoring and 
punishment to provide contextual compliance incentives – balancing all four creates an environment where trustworthy 
behavior is cheap for employees to exhibit and untrustworthy behavior is easily detected by the organization.  This lev-
erages employees as an additional layer of defense and improves the overall security of the organization. 
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